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Causation by Presumption? Why the Supreme Court
Should Reject Phantom Losses and Reverse Broudo
By John C. Coffee, Jr *

Over a quarter of a century ago, Judge Henry Friendly coined the term "fraud
by hindsight" in upholding the dismissal of a proposed securities class action.'
As he explained, it was too simple to look backward with full knowledge of actual
events and allege what should have been earlier disclosed by a public corporation
in its Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings.2 Because hindsight has
twenty/twenty vision, plaintiffs could not fairly "seize [I upon disclosures" in later
3
reports, he ruled, to show what defendants should have disclosed earlier.
Today, a parallel concept-"causation by presumption"-is before the Supreme
Court, and it too deserves to be rejected. At issue is whether a loss that never
actually occurred in the real world-but arguably would have if other events had
not intervened or if full corrective disclosure had been made-can support a Rule
lOb-5 cause of action against a public corporation. The key problem with such a
hypothetical determination of loss involves the limited institutional competence
of judges and juries to infer losses. Generally, markets determine the loss, and the
judicial system (judges and juries) allocates it among the parties to litigation. This
makes sense; markets know best what information to value, and the legal factfinder can best make the normative judgments about the defendant's requisite
4
culpability and relative fault.
Yet, under Broudo v. Dura Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,5 the case now before the Supreme Court, the judicial system (typically the jury) would potentially determine
both. Losses uncorroborated by any form of market reaction to the discovery that
material information had been misstated or omitted could be awarded. For exProfessor Coffee is the Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law at Columbia Law School and Director of its
Center on Corporate Governance.
*

1. See Denny v. Barber, 576 E2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. These are the critical decisions for the factfinder in Rule lOb-5 litigation. Did the defendant act
with the requisite scienter? What "percentage of responsibility" does the defendant bear in proportion
to others? See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(2) (2000) (mandating proportionate liability unless the defendant
had actual knowledge of the misstatement).
5. 339 E3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2904 (2004). Broudo did not come from
out of the blue. It follows an earlier Ninth Circuit decision that also held that damages could be
measured at the time of the purchase transaction and did not require a subsequent decline for a loss
to be sustained. See Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney, 90 E3d 1431, 1438 (9th Cir. 1996); but see cases
cited infra note 20 (holding that time of purchase price inflation is insufficient).
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ample, in the absence of such a market reaction, the jury could determine that
the stock price was inflated-even though the market price of the stock either
never declined or declined for entirely unrelated reasons. Broudo's approach has
been formalized by my able colleague, Professor Merritt Fox, in his companion
article. 6 Under his proposed methodology, once "the plaintiff successfully pleads
that the misstatement is material, there should be for pleading purposes a presumption that the misstatement inflated the purchase price."7 This is what I term
"causation by presumption," because its net effect is to eliminate any real obligation to show a causal connection between a material misrepresentation or omission, and any actual stock market decline. This premise that, because material
adverse information was not disclosed, the price must therefore have been inflated, is, however, highly questionable. That a jury finds a fact to be material
does not mean that the market would have given it weight. To say this is not to
reject efficient market theory, but only to recognize that the factfinder's conclusion
is not the judgment of that market.
More generally, permitting such hypothetical loss determinations without corroboration from any actual market movement expands the role of courts and juries
beyond their historical domain (which was to allocate losses that demonstrably
existed), and shrinks the role of the market. Ultimately, markets, rather than
courts, are better at determining the extent of the loss, if any, that has occurred,
even if the market reaction may sometimes mask a possible loss because of offsetting positive and negative developments. Part I of this Article will examine the
practical implications of Broudo's approach to causation.,
Part II then turns to Broudo's policy implications for securities class actions and
shareholder welfare. Rule 10b-5 class actions tend disproportionately to be secondary market class actions in which the defendant corporation has neither
bought nor sold its own shares during the relevant period. Within this context,
the need for a market corroboration of a loss seems strongest because such a
securities class action essentially pits one class of shareholders (those who traded
within the class period) against all other shareholders. Inherently, in the secondary
market context, such actions generate wealth transfers from the latter class of
generally nonculpable shareholders to the former class.
Why we should wish to maximize the number and amount of these intrashareholder wealth transfers is a question that seems to have escaped serious
policy debate. But such a debate is needed because these transfers seem likely to
produce net losses in the real world, once the considerable transactions costs
extracted by the legal profession are subtracted. Broudo does not create this problem, but it exacerbates it. Thus, although Professor Fox incisively explains the

6. See Merritt Fox, Demystifying Causation in Fraud-on-the-MarketActions, 60 Bus. LAw. 507 (2005).
7. Id. at 520 n.52.
8. The topic of causation is the source and subject of endless debate in academic legal circles,
particularly as it relates to tort law (as it does here). See, e.g., H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, CAUSATION
IN THE LAw (2d ed. 1985); Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REv.
543 (1962). Hopefully, the Supreme Court will resolve this issue before academics can muddy these
waters further.
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incongruence between traditional reliance theories and the context of secondary
trading in an efficient market, his analysis ducks the real policy issue, namely, the
legitimacy of maximizing wealth transfers among generally diversified shareholders. Until this issue is placed at the forefront of any policy analysis, discussions
of presumptions and burdens of proof merely rearrange the deck chairs on the
Titanic.
In fairness to Professor Fox, his doctrinal history is succinct and accurate, and
he clearly demonstrates that transaction causation is logically irrelevant to this
open market context (and in fact, courts have quietly dispensed with it). But his
attempt to dispense similarly with loss causation takes him, I believe, a bridge
too far. Eliminating loss causation (or replacing it with a presumption) forces the
corporate defendant to act as an insurer who must compensate shareholders who
traded within the class period for losses that may have only a tenuous relationship
with any misrepresentation it made. Such insurance is not only expensive, but it
provides no real benefit for diversified shareholders who fall into both classes and
thus wind up effectively transferring wealth from one pocket to another (minus
considerable legal costs). For all these reasons, little policy justification exists to
further liberalize the standards applicable to secondary market Rule lob-5 litigation against a nontrading issuer.
Part III will turn to doctrinal and statutory issues. The approach of both Broudo
and Professor Fox conflicts with the methodology that the Supreme Court has
laid out for construing Rule lOb-5's contours, namely, that as an implied cause
of action, Rule lob-5 must mirror the most closely comparable express cause of
action. 9 In fact, the most closely comparable provisions define loss causation so
as to focus exclusively on the "depreciation in value" of the security, thereby
implying that initial price inflation at the time of purchase without subsequent
"depreciation in value" is insufficient.' 0 In addition, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) makes proof of loss causation mandatory in a
Rule 10b-5 action, and it clearly assigns the burden of proof on that issue to the
plaintiff. I This allocation of the burden is frustrated, however, if courts recognize
a presumption of causation based only on a proper pleading of materiality
Current law also draws an entirely sensible distinction between the primary
and secondary market contexts, placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove loss
causation in the secondary market context, but shifting it to the defendant to
disprove loss causation in the primary market context.12 This distinction would
be frustrated if merely pleading that a misstatement "inflated" the issuer's stock
price could suffice to satisfy the loss causation standard in the secondary market
3
context (because such proof will clearly not work in the primary market context).'
9. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 77z-2, 78j-1, 78u-4, 78u-5 (2000).
12. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
13. As discussed below, sections 11(e) and 12(b) of the 1933 Act disallow losses other than the
"depreciation in value" of the security attributable to the misstatement. See infra note 54. An "inflated"
stock has by definition not depreciated, and only the decline can be recovered under these sections.
See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
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WHAT'S AT STAKE IN BROUDO

In Broudo, the defendant Dura Pharmaceuticals announced lower than forecast
earnings in February 1998, and suffered a very sharp drop in its stock price (fortyseven percent in one day). Plaintiffs alleged, however, that materially false misstatements were made over an approximately nine month period from April 1997
to January 1998, which preceded the February 1998 earnings surprise. These
misstatements related to an asthma medication delivery device that Dura was
developing. Ultimately, in November 1998, Dura announced that the Federal
Drug Administration had refused to approve this product, but plaintiffs did not
4
allege that the market declined in response to this announcement. In short, an
obvious disconnect is apparent between the market decline and plaintiffs' theory
of fraud.
Although the district court dismissed the complaint in Broudo for failure to
plead "loss causation,"'15 the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiff need
not plead any causal connection between the misstatement and a subsequent
decline in price, but only need plead "that the stock's price at the time of purchase
was overstated and ... sufficient identification of the cause ... ."16 The Supreme
17
Court granted certiorari on this issue.
Professor Fox believes that the Ninth Circuit got it right. Because the market
was efficient, Dura's allegedly false "statement can be presumed to have inflated
'
the price paid for its shares." "Thus," he concludes, "the pleadings are satisfactory
9
as to causation."' In short, the plaintiff need only plead price inflation and not
that the stock price subsequently fell. From an economic perspective, Professor
Fox's theory is coherent; if you make a material misstatement, it must inflate the
market price, and so the shareholders purchasing at that inflated price are injured.
14. According to the amicus brief for the United States, Dura's stock price fell after the November
1998 disclosure from $12 3/8 to $9 3/4. Within twelve trading days, however, Dura's stock price rose
above the pre-announcement price to approximately $12 1/2. Plaintiffs did not allege any damages
because of this decline. Professor Fox suggests that this may have been an oversight on their part. See
Fox, supra note 6, at 531 n.85. More likely, however, plaintiffs omitted any such reference because of
the impact of the PSLRA, which disallows short-term stock losses when the stock price rebounds. See
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (2000) (requiring that damages not exceed the difference between purchase price
and mean trading price over the ninety-day trading period "beginning on the date on which the
information correcting the misstatement or omission that is the basis for the action is disseminated to
the market."). This language also seems to require some form of a corrective disclosure and a downward market movement as a precondition to damages, thus implying that price inflation alone is
insufficient. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
15. In re Dura Pharms. Inc. Sec. Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15258, at *35 (S.D. Cal. July 11,
2000).
16. Broudo v. Dura Pharms., Inc., 339 E3d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 2904
(2004).
17. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 124 S.Ct. 2904 (2004). Broudo defines the issue before the
Court as "[wlhether a securities fraud plaintiff invoking the fraud-on-the-market theory must demonstrate loss causation by pleading and proving a causal connection between the alleged fraud and
the investment's subsequent decline in price."
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at I, Dura Pharms., Inc. v.Broudo (No. 03-932) [hereinafter Brief for the United States].
The Solicitor General answers this question in the affirmative but would under some circumstances
permit a loss uncorroborated by any market movement to suffice. Id. at 19. 1believe this is a fairly
weak compromise. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
18. Fox, supra note 6, at 531.
19. Id.
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But from a legal and institutional perspective, this presumption is more suspect,
and in any event, the law of fraud has never condensed to this simple and skeletal
formula.20

Initially, it is important to focus on the incentive effects created by this theory
that the plaintiff need only allege price inflation. Under such an interpretation of
Broudo, materiality subsumes causation. Once materiality is shown, some price
inflation is to be presumed. As a result, the practical impact of this rule would be
to give plaintiffs' lawyers a strong and seemingly perverse incentive to search the
stock market for significant stock price declines and then seek to allege that some
material information had been withheld or misstated-even if, as in Broudo, other,
fully disclosed developments (i.e., the earnings shortfall in that case) seemed to
explain better the stock price decline.
To illustrate, assume that Foreign Corporation, whose stock is actively traded
in the U.S. market, is suddenly nationalized or simply shut down by its home
country, and its price falls from $50 per share to zero. The proximate cause of
this loss may seem obvious, but if plaintiffs can plausibly allege that Foreign
Corporation had inflated its financial statements so that its true intrinsic value
was only $30 per share at the time that class members purchased its stock, then,
under Broudo, they can sue for this $20 worth of inflation--even though there is
no market corroboration that any misstatement would have had such an impact.
To be sure, some allocation of the loss would be necessary between the nonfraudulent causes of the stock price decline and the alleged material misstatements
or omissions. But this would not need to be done until one reached the damages
stage of the action. In the real world of securities class action litigation, this stage
is seldom reached.
The practical impact of eliminating any requirement that the plaintiff plead a
causal connection to a subsequent stock decline is that many more cases would
survive dismissal at the pleading stage, because the plaintiff's lawyer would only
have to plead materiality and scienter At trial, the plaintiff's lawyer could plausibly
assert that some portion of the stock drop was attributable to the market's discovery of some or all of the undisclosed or misstated material facts (even if most
of the stock drop seemed more attributable to a fully disclosed cause). Or, alternatively, the plaintiff could assert that the stock price was still inflated.2 1 Although
Professor Fox makes clear that he would not allow damages without some actual

20. Even in Basic, Inc. v.Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988), the Court did insist "that reliance is
an element of a Rule lOb-5 cause of action" and that the plaintiff must demonstrate "the requisite
causal connection between a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiff's injury." Cases in a number
of circuits, both before and after Broudo, have reached contrary results, finding that a pleading of price
inflation alone is insufficient to plead loss causation. See, e.g., Emergent Capital Inv Mgmt., LLC v.
Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F3d 189, 198 (2d Cir. 2003); Semerenko v- Cendant Corp., 223 E3d
165, 185 (3d Cir. 2000); Robbins v.Koger Props., Inc., 116 F3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1997). The
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS also takes a contrary approach in its definition of the requisite
element of loss causation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 548A cmt. b (1977); see infra notes 5051 and accompanying text.
21. Admittedly, the plaintiff would be more rational in such a setting simply to sell his inflated
shares before they fell in value, but an indexed institutional investor might claim that it needed to
hold the stock to maintain a diversified portfolio.
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decline in the stock's value, Broudo is far less clear and might allow a recovery
even in the absence of a stock market decline.
In practice, the most likely scenario under Broudo would be something like
this: A high-tech company fails to disclose that a key patent may not be valid and
enforceable because it infringes on that of a rival company Plaintiffs assert that
the stock, which has long traded at $100 per share, is really worth only $70
because of this problem. But before any disclosure is made, all of the company's
senior managers die in a crash of their corporate jet, and, without them, this startup company cannot continue. The stock price falls to $10.22 Plaintiffs assert that
because the full truth had not been revealed, the $30 difference between the
purchase price of $100 and the intrinsic value of $70 can be recovered under
Rule 10b-5.
How should we answer Professor Fox's claim that the shareholders who bought
at $100 were truly injured at the time of their purchase by the company's failure
to disclose a material problem with its patents, and thus they should be able to
recover the difference between $100 and the stock's alleged "intrinsic value" of
$70-without showing any market correction attributable to the misstatement or
omission? Several different answers can be given that all reiterate the basic theme
that the loss here is a "phantom loss"-one simply too speculative and indefinite
in the absence of any evidence that the market considered the stock to have been
overvalued because of the alleged patent problem. First, even if judges and juries
are competent to determine the materiality of the misstatement, they cannot reliably measure its financial impact in the absence of some market evaluation of
the corrected disclosure. Was the material nondisclosure worth $10 or $ 70? Juries
generally do not have a clue. Second, even if material adverse information was
not disclosed (as in the foregoing patent hypothetical), material positive information may have also been withheld for proprietary reasons, so that the $100
purchase price did in fact reflect intrinsic value (or even fell below intrinsic value).
This is not implausible, because corporations have an incentive to withhold proprietary information from their competitors. 23 Third, the nondisclosure of the
patent problem went to a risk that may or may not materialize. In fact, if it had
been disclosed, assume that the market price would have sunk temporarily to
$70, but ultimately it would have rebounded to $100, or more, when the company won the patent litigation. Why should nonselling shareholders be compensated for only a temporary decline in their corporation's stock price that never
affected them?
Finally and most importantly, the stock may have been inflated, but the real
cause was a market bubble. 24 The plaintiff shareholders may have purchased in
22. This example roughly corresponds to the example given in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 548A cmt. b (1977).
23. This point has been much emphasized by some commentators. See Edmund W Kitch, The
Theory and Practiceof Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 772 (1995).
24. The word "bubble"-or its politer euphemism, "irrational exuberance"-does not appear in
Professor Fox's article because it is not recognized by the lexicon of efficient market theory Nonetheless, some financial economists assign it considerable weight in explaining investor behavior. See
ROBERTJ. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 173-90 (2000).
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the secondary market in the aftermath of an initial public offering (IPO), when
the stock price soared, pushed upward by an overheated market. 25 Thus, the price
inflation may not be attributable to any misstatement, even if a material misstatement were made. Hence, to hold the issuer liable on these facts is to make it an
insurer for the market's "irrational exuberance." But again, this results in a system
of extraordinarily expensive self-insurance for diversified investors, which they
clearly would not purchase if given the choice. Endless variations on all these
themes can be posed, but the major point here is that the jury's inference of what
the market price would have been had the misstatement or omission not been
made involves a speculative judgment in which we can have little confidence.
Professor Fox characterizes my objections as "evidentiary" in nature and adds
that I "appear[] to have little trust in the ability of the judge at summary judgment
and the jury at trial to deal reliably with" these issues.2 6 He then suggests that
judges and juries can deal "sensibly" with these issues. 27 This is, of course, an
empirical issue. The latest data shows that on a percentage basis, few securities
class actions are dismissed before trial and that even this low rate has dropped
significantly since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.28 Although dismissal
rates vary significantly by circuit, in the Second and Ninth Circuits, which have
the highest volumes of securities class action litigation, only eight percent and six
percent, respectively, of all securities class actions were dismissed within two years
of the action's filing.29 In short, even with today's strict rules (in most circuits) on
loss causation, only a low percentage of securities class actions are dismissed, and
Professor Fox would liberalize the pleading standard so that even fewer would be
dismissed. This is not a small point. Procedurally, courts have only limited opportunities to dismiss an action before trial, and Professor Fox's proposal would
eliminate one of these. Nor is summary judgment an adequate substitute, because
if there are triable factual issues, the court has no discretion and must let the
action proceed to trial.
The differences between Professor Fox and myself may well boil down, on the
operational level, to my insistence that procedure counts. From his ex ante perspective, it can be argued that dropping loss causation as a necessary element in
the liability equation does not truly change much, because the plaintiff still must
25. Rule lOb-5 will be the plaintiff's remedy of choice in this context, because damages under
section 11 (e) of the 1933 Act are cut off at "the price at which the security was offered to the public"
(i.e., the original offering price in the IPO). 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2000). Hence, there will be no damages
under section 11 unless and until the price in the secondary market drops below the initial offering
price, which often does not happen. To this degree, section 11 is "bubble-proof," but Rule 1Ob-5 is
not.

26. Fox, supra note 6, at 525.
27. Id.
28. Elaine Buckberg et al., Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation:2003 Early Update, CLAss
ACTION LITiG. REP., Apr. 23, 2004, at 304, available at www.nera.com/publication.asp?p-1D = 2059.
National Economic Research Associates (NERA) regularly tracks the trends and status of securities
class action litigation and publishes regular reports. Its most recent report finds that "there have been
one-third fewer dismissals since [the Sarbanes-Oxley Act], a statistically significant drop compared to
the prior pace." Id.at 4.
29. Id.at 5. This statistic is only for the first two years of the action's life, but if a securities class
action survives that long, settlement becomes much more likely
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prove damages. Arguably, the issues that are today addressed in most circuits
under the heading of causation would instead simply be postponed to the later
stage at which damages are determined (where the plaintiff would still bear the
burden of proof). This might be correct in theory if cases were actually litigated
at this damage determination stage, but they are not. Cases that survive pretrial
dismissal tend to be settled. Hence, any proposal to substitute a presumption of
causation for the traditional loss causation rule (as Professor Fox proposes) substantially tilts the playing field to the disadvantage of defendants. Delaying the
issue of causation until the damages phase realistically means that (i) the issue of
causation would be at least partially transferred from the court's control to the
jury's discretion, and (ii) the defendants would lose their current opportunity for
a pretrial screening of the case by the court. Thus, both in terms of timing and
the allocation of responsibility between the judge and the jury, Broudo's rule, and,
even more so, Professor Fox's codification of it, are adverse to defendants and
will raise the settlement value of securities class actions.
The full scope of the problems that Broudo raises comes into clearest focus only
when we consider the prospect that multiple plaintiffs, each relying on different
public statements made at different times, could all assert that the corporation's
stock price was overvalued because of material misrepresentations made at or
prior to the time they purchased-but that this price inflation was never detected
(or at least fully corrected) by the market. To illustrate, assume that a large block
of shares in Corporation X was purchased at three different times during 2004:
(i) by a state public pension fund on April 1, 2004 at a price of $60 per share,
which price was allegedly inflated because Corporation X had failed to disclose
that it used an improper accounting principle in determining its 2003 earnings
(which results had been publicly released at that point); (ii) by a mutual fund on
June 1, 2004, also at $60 per share, but at a time when Corporation X allegedly
knew, but had not disclosed, that it was subject to material environmental liabilities that were likely to be asserted eventually; and (iii) by a hedge fund on October
15, 2004, also at $60 per share, at a time when Corporation X allegedly knew,
but had not disclosed, that its principal customer had terminated their long-term
exclusive dealing agreement. Throughout this period and thereafter, Corporation
X's stock price remains stable at $60-until April 1, 2005 when it suddenly falls
to $40 per share. Each of these investors sues in a different court (two in federal
court, and the third in state court), each alleging that the stock price had been
inflated at the time of their purchase. Under Broudo, all they need allege is materiality and scienter Each could win its own proceeding, each potentially recovering the full $20 difference per share (or more, if they convinced the jury that
the market had not yet fully corrected the inflation). Even if the defendant introduced persuasive evidence that some extrinsic event (i.e., a change in interest
rates or a world crisis) had caused the market decline from $60 to $40 per share,
30
plaintiffs could reply that the latent price inflation in their case still remained.
30. If only in a footnote, some skepticism needs to be expressed here about this idea of a loss that
the market never discovers. An ancient maxim of Wall Street is that "a bargain that stays a bargain is
no bargain." But the other side of this coin should be that "a loss that never materializes is no loss."
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Beyond the practical problems in such litigation, the greater problem in applying "efficient market" reasoning to the context of securities litigation may be that
lawyers and economists often mean different things when they use the same
words. An economist knows that an efficient market will respond to all new
material information, incorporating it into price immediately But a lawyer knows
that the concept of "materiality," as it is applied in courts, is broad and liberal. A
"material" fact is one as to which "there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
' 3
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote. " ' This is an
expansive test that asks the jury to determine if the information is "important" to
a rational decision. Such a definition is broader than the economic definition of
materiality, which typically focuses on future discounted cash flows. Facts so
found to be material under this legal standard may or may not move the market.
Thus, a jury's determination that material facts were not disclosed does not necessarily imply that there has been price inflation, nor should such inflation be
presumed. Because the two professions have different understandings of the same
term, it is dangerous to presume that a legal conclusion necessarily should have
real world implications for markets.

II. A POLICY PERSPECTIVE ON THE SECONDARY MARKET
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION
The context of secondary market trading is very different from that of the
primary market in which the corporation issues shares to investors who purchase
from it. Because of the long-established separation of ownership and control in
the United States, the vast majority of the stock in "public" companies will be
owned by dispersed shareholders holding relatively small percentage stakes, with
this ownership being divided approximately equally between institutional investors and retail investors. When a securities class action is brought against a public
corporation by investors who purchased in the open market at allegedly inflated
prices (i.e., the typical secondary market context), the action inherently pits one
class of shareholders against another: those purchasing within the "class period"
(i.e., the time period during which the market was allegedly affected by material
misinformation) against those who purchased either before or after the class period. Any judgment or settlement in this action will be borne by the corporation
(and thus indirectly by all its current shareholders) .32 As a result, securities litigation in this context inherently results in a wealth transfer between two classes
of public shareholders, neither of whom is necessarily culpable. Worse still, even
if we assume that fraud was present, the beneficiaries of the fraud are the persons

31. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). In addition, the Court added that "there must be a substantial
likelihood that the disclosure ... would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available." Id. at 231-32 (quoting TSC Indus.,
Inc., 426 U.S. at 449).
32. The corporation may well be partially insured for such liabilities. But, the cost of insurance is
again borne by all the shareholders.
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who sold at inflated prices-the selling shareholders-and they escape without
incurring any cost when liability is later imposed on their former corporation.
Equally perverse are the implications that flow from the fact that most investors
are diversified. In all likelihood, such investors will belong to both the plaintiff
class that sues and the residual shareholder class that bears the cost of the litigation. Either they will have purchased stock at times that are both inside and
outside the class period, or, viewed in the aggregate, they will own stock in many
corporations that are the subject of securities class actions, sometimes being a
shareholder within the class period and sometimes not. As a result, at least in the
aggregate, diversified investors are making wealth transfers to themselves, shifting
money, as it were, from one pocket to the other-minus, of course, the considerable transactions costs that both sides pay to the legal profession. Indeed, if the
legal and other costs borne by the corporation are added to the fees and expenses
received by the plaintiff's lawyer, this sum on average may well exceed the net
recovery to the class. 33 At a minimum, it is clear that recovery rates in securities
class actions are extremely modest: 2.8% of investor losses in 2003, up from 2.7%
in 2002. 34 In short, as a mechanism for delivering compensation, securities class
actions are far from successful and may inflict increased compensatory losses on
shareholders.
This is not to deny that there could be deterrent benefits from such class actions, 35 but again these benefits should not be idealized or assumed. Insurance
typically protects the individual defendants (and often the corporation as well),
and this cost again falls on shareholders. Also, if only 2.7% to 2.8% of investor
losses are recovered on average, this cost may be easily absorbed by those who
have an incentive to inflate the company's financial statements. Most importantly,
for deterrence to work, the costs must fall either on the culpable or at least on
those who are the best cost avoiders-that is, those who can take effective precautions to minimize the risks. As a practical matter, this means that actions
33. Although there are many studies of the plaintiff's legal fees and expenses in securities litigation,
I am aware of none that add in the defendants' costs in order to estimate the true net recovery, if any,
for shareholders as a class. Additional costs that might go into this equation include the cost of liability
insurance, the additional risk premium that auditors may charge because of liability risks, the diverted
time of management, and the imputed time of in-house counsel.
34. See Buckberg et al., supra note 28, at 8. The highest recovery rate for investors was apparently
7.2% in 1996. Id.
35. Although Professor Fox and I agree that securities class actions need to be justified on this
basis, most deterrence comes from parallel claims against controlling shareholders and gatekeepers
(such as auditors and investment bankers). To be sure, corporate officers do not wish to be sued, and
so even open market class actions based on stock drops generate some general deterrence. But from
a general tort law perspective, it makes better sense to focus on who is the best cost avoider and
impose liability on that person. The obvious answer is that the senior management and/or the controlling persons of the issuer, or the company's gatekeepers, can do more to minimize the costs
associated with materially misleading disclosures than can dispersed shareholders.
Lest it be thought that I am viewing all litigation issues exclusively from the defendants' perspective,
see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant
Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2004) (proposing stricter liability standards for gatekeepers). Litigation
against gatekeepers and controlling persons, or against the corporation itself in the IPO context, makes
far more sense than litigation against a public corporation with dispersed ownership in the secondary
market context.
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directed against corporate managers, controlling shareholders, auditors, underwriters, or other gatekeepers should have some desirable deterrent effect, but
when the liability simply falls on the corporation, as the residual risk bearer, the
deterrent effect is dissipated.
Finally, there is the problem of error and its costs. When liability is imposed
for a loss that was not causally related to a misstatement or omission made by
the defendant, the law generates only an unfocused deterrence, and a windfall is
awarded to one class of shareholders (typically, the buying shareholders) at the
expense of other shareholders. Such mistakes are not costless to shareholders,
because the defendants who pay will demand a risk premium in the future before
they again serve as an auditor, underwriter, or other gatekeeper. Also, such deterrence may induce overly conservative financial reporting and/or earnings management that is intended to reduce stock price volatility, and thereby minimize
the risk of future liability
For these reasons, I find Professor Fox's analysis too facile when he argues that
"deter corporate misstatements" and thereby increase
fraud-on-the-market actions
"share price accuracy" 36 To be sure, they could do so, but the impact of his
proposal to drop the loss causation requirement may be more to diffuse deterrence
than to focus it. To the extent that causation is presumed based only on a showing
of materiality, the likelihood grows that cases will settle for substantial recoveries
where the actual cause of the stock market decline was unrelated. The costs of
these settlements would fall like a tax on all shareholders, and such unfocused
deterrence may do more harm than good. No policy rationale seems discernible
that justifies liberalizing the standards applicable to causation in order to encourage this type of litigation (as opposed to actions against the truly responsible
actors).

III.

THE BATTLE IN THE DOCTRINAL TRENCHES: HOW THE
COURT Is LIKELY TO RULE

Although Professor Fox and I have debated loss causation on an abstract level,
the Supreme Court will likely resolve this issue on a far more pedestrian and
doctrinal level, following an approach that it has laid out in earlier decisions. As
the Court noted in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson ("Lampf,
Pleva"),37 Rule 10b-5 is a judicially fashioned, implied cause of action, one that
Congress never really enacted. 38 In such a context, the Court concluded, the scope
and contours of this implied cause of action must parallel the nearest similar
express cause of action. 39 In Lampf, Pleva, the Court found sections 9 and 18 of
the 1934 Act to constitute the closest "comparable express remedial provisions,"
and thus it looked to their statutes of limitations to determine the applicable
40
statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5.
36. Fox, supra note 6, at 529.

37. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
38. Id. at 359.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 359-61.
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A brief examination of these two sections shows that both also contemplate
that a plaintiff must prove loss causation. For example, section 18 expressly authorizes a suit to be brought for a misleading statement in an SEC filing, but only
by a person "who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold
a security at a price which was affected by such statement, for damages caused
by such reliance .
"..."41This language seems to require both traditional reliance
and that the stock price be "affected" by the misstatement. 2 Finally, because section 18 limits recoverable damages to the "damages caused by such reliance," it
expressly requires a causal connection. But this language may not answer all
questions. If the stock price was inflated by a misleading statement and has not
fallen in response to any corrective disclosure, the plaintiffs will predictably claim
that they have suffered "damages caused by such reliance" on the theory that the
original price inflation represents their "damages." That such latent inflation constitutes recoverable "damages" seems dubious to me, but the statutory language
is at least susceptible to divergent readings.
If section 18 does not clearly resolve the issue of whether alleging price inflation
is sufficient, it may answer an even more important question, because the express
43
language of section 18 permits the Court to reconsider Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,
which established the current doctrinal formula that the plaintiff in an efficient
market relies on the "integrity of the price set by the market."4 Because section
18 expressly requires actual reliance on the statement itself, it follows that, if
section 18 is the appropriate template to which Rule lob-5 must conform, then
reliance on the "integrity of the price set by the market" would be insufficient to
establish causation for Rule 10b-5 purposes.4 5
Section 9 of the 1934 Act also contains similar language that requires that the
plaintiff purchase or sell the "security at a price which was affected by such act
or transaction." 46 Again, this language arguably could be read to cover price inflation without a subsequent market correction (i.e., the facts of Broudo), but
section 9(e) does limit the damages recoverable to the "damages sustained as a
result of any such act or transaction."' 47 If the market has not corrected, it seems
more questionable here than under section 18 that the holder of stock at an
inflated price has "sustained" any damages. 48 Thus, if section 9 is the template to

41. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (2000). It is arguable, I concede, that the phrase "affected by such statement"
could only require that there be some price inflation and not that there be any subsequent price
decline.
42. Section 18 does not seem to expressly contemplate liability for an omission (although statements made could be misleading because of omissions).
43. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).

44. Id. at 245.
45. 1 do not mean to endorse this argument, but only to point to the conclusion to which a "plain
meaning" approach may lead.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (2000).
47. Id.
48. Because such a holder can still sell the stock at the inflated price, it is linguistically difficult to
see how this plaintiff has "sustained" any injury. Such a plaintiff is rather only exposed to potential
future injury.
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which Rule 10b-5 must conform, then only damages that were "sustained," not
mere inflation, can be recovered.
The issue of loss causation under Rule 10b-5 is more directly addressed by the
PSLRA, which added section 21D(b)(4) to the 1934 Act. It provides: "(4) Loss
Causation In any private action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall have
the burden of proving that the act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate
this chapter caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages." 49
This provision clearly assigns the burden of proof on loss causation to the plaintiff.
Hence, Professor Fox's view that courts should create a presumption of causation
based on a proper pleading of materiality reverses Congress's allocation of the
burden of proof. On the other hand, the above provision does not clearly state
that proving price inflation is insufficient or that there must be a subsequent price
decline following corrective disclosure.
Still, section 2 1D(b)(4) clearly intends to refer to an established doctrine called
"loss causation." The contours of this established doctrine are clearly set forth in
comment b of section 548A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states that:
one who misrepresents the financial condition of a corporation in order to
sell its stock will become liable to a purchaser who relies upon the misinformation for the loss that he sustains when the facts as to the finances of
the corporation become generally known and as a result the value of the
50
shares is depreciated on the market.
simply by
Clearly, this definition requires a market correction and is not satisfied
51
the claim that the stock price was inflated at the time of purchase.
Two last statutory arguments may be more dispositive. First, section 12(b) of
the 1933 Act was added by the PSLRA at the same time section 21D(b)(4) was
added to the 1934 Act. 52 It expressly disallows from the damages recoverable
under section 12 "any portion or all of the amount recoverable ... other than the
depreciation in value of the subject security resulting from such part of the pro...53 In short, only the "despectus or oral communication... not being true.
preciation in value," not the original price inflation, can be recovered. Of course,
section 12 of the 1933 Act is addressing the primary market, not the secondary
market addressed by Rule 10b-5 and section 21D(b)(4). Yet, it seems self-evident
that stricter standards should apply in the latter case where the defendant did not
trade and is sued as a de facto insurer. After all, in both sections 11 and 12 of
the 1933 Act, the two primary market anti-fraud provisions, Congress placed the

49. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000)50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A cmt. b (1977)51. It might be argued that section 548A is addressing only the primary market context where the
defendant sells the stock to the plaintiff. But, a fortiori, the standard should be even stricter in the
secondary market context where the judgment falls on generally nonculpable shareholders.
52. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub L. 104-67, § 105, 109 Stat. 737, 757
(1995) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 771), Id. § 21D(4), 109 Stat. at 743 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 771(b) (2000).
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burden of disproving loss causation on the defendant, 5 but in section 21D(b)(4),
55
which applies to Rule lOb-5, it squarely places that burden on the plaintiff.
Although the burden of proof is different between the loss causation provisions
in the two statutes, there is no reason to believe that Congress wanted the concept
of loss causation to be substantively different in the two statutes. 56 If anything,
Congress wanted loss causation to be a greater barrier to a plaintiff's recovery
under the 1934 Act than under the 1933 Act, which is why it assigned the burden
of proof to the plaintiff under the 1934 Act. It would frustrate this intent, and
indeed reverse the relative significance of the loss causation provision in the two
statutes, if loss causation were defined not to require a post-purchase "depreciation in value" under the 1934 Act. Hence, section 12(b) of the 1933 Act should
be read in pari materia with sections 21D(b)(4) of the 1934 Act.
A second statutory argument flows out of section 21(D)(e) of the 1934 Act,
which was also added by the PSLRA in 1995, and which places a ceiling on
damages so that they may not exceed the difference between the purchase price
paid by the plaintiff (where the plaintiff is a buyer) "and the mean trading price
of that security during the 90-day period beginning on the date on which the
information correcting the misstatement or omission that is the basis for the action
is disseminated to the market."' 57 This language was expressly drafted to limit
damages under Rule lOb-5 when the stock price rebounds after an initial decline
(as it did in Broudo). 58 Clearly, it assumes that there will be a market correction
before there can be liability and then seeks to exclude short-term market corrections (probably because it considered them to be more the product of market
volatility than actual fraud). Although this provision's intent was to deny damages
when there is an immediate price rebound, this language logically also precludes
59
liability when there is no decline (even if the stock price remains "inflated").
In closing, it is important to stress what this Article is not arguing-the decline
in value need not follow the corporation's own corrective disclosure. Indeed, it
can precede such a disclosure and be the result of press reports, governmental
actions, market rumors, or a short seller's attack. But there must be some market
response before a plaintiff can sustain damages, and the plaintiff must plead and
prove that such a decline was causally connected to the defendant's misstatement

54. Section 11 (e) of the 1933 Act allows the defendant to establish an affirmative defense by proving
that claimed damages represent "other than the depreciation in value of such security resulting from
[the misstatement or omission in] the registration statement .... " 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2000). Section
12(b), which was added in 1995, was modeled on section 11(e) and also requires the defendant to
disprove loss causation. Id. § 771(b). Both provisions refer to "depreciation in value," thus indicating
that there must be a post-purchase decline in price. In contrast, section 21D(b)(4) places the burden
of proof on the plaintiff, reflecting in part the fact that it is suing a nontrading issuer. Id. § 78u-4(b)(4).
55. Id.
56. This point is made in the Government's amicus brief. See Brief for the United States, supra note
17, at 25.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e).
58. For Broudo's facts, see supra note 14.
59. If defendants were to issue a press release summarizing plaintiff's charges when plaintiff filed
the class action, this step might serve to trigger the express language of this section.
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or omission. Price inflation that is never corrected through a market decline is
too hypothetical an injury to constitute recoverable damages.
CONCLUSION
When it is decided, Broudo could resolve a lot or only a little. It could reconsider
Basic v. Levinson, which could be significantly curtailed in the light of the PSLRA
and Lampf, Pleva.60 Or, the Court could simply accept the position of the Solicitor
General that the plaintiff must plead and prove some post-purchase decline in
value of the security in order to satisfy loss causation. The Solicitor General's
position is extremely modest because it requires only "that the inflation in the
price of the security attributable to the misrepresentation was eliminated or reduced." 6' That the inflation only need be "reduced" requires very little, and the
Solicitor General's brief even argues that "a drop in the stock price may not be a
necessary condition for establishing loss causation in every fraud[-]on-the-market
case." 62 Surprisingly, it goes even further to suggest that the "inflation attributable
to a misrepresentation might be reduced or eliminated even if there were a net
63
increase in price."
If this is all that the decision holds, its impact will be very modest indeed.
Instead, the Court should rule that because section 12(b) of the 1933 Act and
section 21D(b)(4) of the 1934 Act are to be read in tandem, there must be a stock
price decline, and only "depreciation in value" attributable to a material misstatement or omission can be recovered under Rule 10b-5, at least in the secondary
market context of a company traded in an active securities market.6
The debate over Broudo and loss causation also shows the dangers in a shotgun
marriage of law and economics. Procedure counts, and its goals and concerns
tend to be excessively discounted by a purely ex ante approach to law and litigation. In particular, the concept of materiality means different things to lawyers
and economists. Plugging a jury's legal conclusion that an omitted fact was material into the framework of efficient market theory makes little sense. Preserving
judicial discretion and pretrial screening of cases makes more sense, and the
60. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. I do not expect that Broudo will be used as the
vehicle for such a reconsideration, but pregnant hints could be dropped.
61. Brief for the United States, supra note 17, at 15.
62. Id. at 19. At this point, we are back to allowing the factfinder to make a speculative judgment
uncorroborated by any objective market evidence.
63. Id. This could happen, it adds, if the company simultaneously "corrected the false information
and at the same time issued unrelated positive information." Id. at 19-20. In truth, there seem to be
some internal inconsistencies or at least tensions in the Solicitor General's position. At page 15 of the
Brief for the United States, the Solicitor General argues that the original price inflation must be "eliminated or reduced," but at pages 19 to 20, the brief clarifies this position and claims that simultaneous
price movements in opposite directions are sufficient to show loss causation. Id. at 15, 19-20. This
invites very speculative decisionmaking by the factfinder. One suspects that the SEC resisted any
stronger position on loss causation.
64. In thinner markets, rescissionary remedies may be appropriate, and that topic is not addressed
in this brief Article. I recognize that the issue of damages is distinct from the issue of loss causation,
but both sections 11 and 12b limit damages to "depreciation in value," and there is little reason to
extend Rule lOb-5 further in this context.
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traditional loss causation doctrine does that, at least to a degree. Ultimately, the
issue that most needs informed debate is the issue that will probably be ignored
in the eventual Broudo decision: the legitimacy of making the public corporation
an insurer for market declines in open-market trading cases where the corporation, itself, has not traded with the plaintiffs.

